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Abstract 
 
How has the transition to a market economy affected the relationship between 
wages and productivity across different types of workers and firms? This paper 
examines this question using unusually rich matched employer-employee data 
from Slovenia over the 1992-2001 period.  The findings include strong evidence 
that 1.) state-owned firms overpaid their employees at the onset of transition, a 
finding consistent with theoretical predictions on self-managed firms, 2.) older 
workers have become relatively less productive, indicating a difficulty in 
acquiring the skills demanded in a market economy, 3.) the relative wages of 
workers across demographic characteristics such as gender, age and education 
generally reflect their relative marginal productivity differentials. 
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This paper is divided into three chapters. The first chapter discusses the theory and 
previous empirical research on privatization and workers’ self-management, while the second 
chapter discusses the same aspects of the wage determination literature.  These two chapters 
set the basis and motivation for the final chapter, in which I present my results.  Note that 
the scope of the paper is rather broad by necessity: in order to obtain unbiased estimates of 
relative wage and productivity differentials across different types of firms (i.e. state-owned, 
privatized, newly created, foreign owned), we need to account for differences in worker 
quality across these different types of firms, which involves calculating the relative wage and 
productivity differentials for different types of workers in the process. Conversely, in order 
to obtain unbiased estimates of relative wage and productivity differentials across workers 
with differing demographic characteristics, w need to account for differences in firm 
ownership. The result is the proceeding analysis of wage and productivity differentials across 
different types of workers and firms.  
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Chapter I: Effects of Transition on Productivity and Wage Differentials 
across Different Types of Firms 
1.) Introduction  
A defining part of the transition from a socialist to a market economy has been the 
process of factor and product market liberalization (Krueger, 2004).  During this process, 
government intervention in what had previously been highly regulated spheres of economic 
activity has been greatly curtailed, and market based allocation mechanisms have increasingly 
been given free reign to govern economic activity.  In the process, governments have 
privatized previously state-owned firms, eliminated soft-budget constraints, liberalized 
capital flows from abroad, abolished guaranteed job security, and deregulated the wage 
determination process. The fundamental underlying belief behind these reforms has been 
that market-based incentives will ultimately lead to long-term economic growth and will 
correct the severe distortions inflicted by socialist planners.   
 A decade and a half after the onset of transition, it is clear that most countries have 
overcome the initial difficulties inherent in the transition process. However, many 
fundamental questions about the effects of market liberalization remain unresolved.  For 
example, how has privatization – a key ingredient in transition reforms – affected the wages 
of workers working in different types of firms (e.g. private, de novo¸foreign-owned)?  Are 
workers in state-owned firms, which presumably have less efficient corporate governance 
structures and managerial oversight, able to inflate their wages above what their marginal 
revenue product would warrant?  Have the different wage policies across these different 
types of firms affected the composition of their workforces?  If so, how does the total factor 
productivity of different types of firms differ after we account for differences in labor quality 
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across dimensions such as education, experience, and age?  In other words, to what extent 
has the transition process succeeded in reforming the previously dysfunctional incentive 
regimes? 
In this paper, I explore these questions empirically for a particular transition 
economy: Slovenia. Using matched employer-employee data spanning the first ten years of 
the transition period, I examine several aspects of the dynamic wage determination process. I 
directly test a longstanding hypothesis regarding the behavior of workers in (formerly) self-
managed firms which was first formulated by Ward (1958) – namely, that workers in self-
managed firms appropriate a portion of the firms profit through wages that are higher, ceteris 
paribus, than they would be in a profit-maximizing capitalist firm. I find strong support for 
this hypothesis, as workers in state-owned firms early in transition are paid markedly higher 
wages than workers in privately-owned firms even though they are considerably less 
productive.  I also find that as transition has progressed, competitive pressures have forced 
the wage policies of state-owned firms to converge with those of private firms, as the wage-
productivity gap decreases significantly between 1992 and 2001.  Moreover, the performance 
of privately-owned firms has consistently proven superior to state-owned ones: estimates of 
labor-quality augmented production functions indicate that privatized, foreign-owned and 
newly created firms are 14, 24, and 7 percent more productive than state-owned ones, 
respectively. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In Section 2, I describe the theoretical 
background which motivates the empirical analysis and outline the previous empirical 
research on the subject. Section 3 discusses the country-specific considerations of the study, 
focusing first on the theory and empirical evidence on workers’ self-management and then 
describing the institutional background in Slovenia since the collapse of socialism.  (Note 
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that the discussion of the methodology, actual data used and empirical results is relegated to 
Chapter 3.) 
 
2.) Theoretical background 
 Privatization, when accompanied by the appropriate institutional reforms, is a critical 
aspect of the transition process because it addresses a fundamental source of inefficiency in 
socialist economies: the state’s inability to institute the proper incentives for the economy’s 
managers and workers.  By assigning ownership rights to specific groups of people, 
privatization is seen as a way of addressing the dysfunctional incentive regimes that lead to 
the principal-agent problem, as the new owners are in a superior position to carry out the 
planning, monitoring, and disciplinary functions the principal ought to perform.  Because the 
new owners/shareholders have a profit-maximizing motive, the firm’s decisions will 
presumably be guided by efficiency considerations, and not political ones.  The productivity 
gains arising from improved governance can be categorized along three lines (Filer et al, 
2001): 1.) reductions in slack (moving closer to the production possibilities frontier), 2.) 
improved allocative efficiency (reallocating productive resources along the production 
possibility frontier to more efficient uses), or  3.) greater organizational efficiency (inducing 
outward shifts of the production function through better management or the adoption of 
new production methods). 
 Privatization can only be successful, however, when accompanied by institutional 
reforms which promote efficient, competitive markets.  One crucial goal in the reform 
process must be to eliminate the soft-budget constraint that had allowed unprofitable firms 
to survive under socialism through mechanisms such as distorted factor and product prices 
Matija Vodopivec Wage and Productivity Differentials in Slovenia 
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or transfer payments from the government.1 Since the soft-budget constraint allowed 
unprofitable and unviable firms to remain solvent indefinitely, bankruptcies were virtually 
nonexistent under socialism, and bankruptcy laws were commensurately ill-defined (World 
Bank, 2004).  Thus, transition reforms must also introduce laws which enable bankruptcy to 
occur and, conversely, lower barriers to entry to facilitate the creation of new firms.   
Facilitating firm exit is important because it enables unviable firms to exit and free up scarce 
resources – land, labor, capital – for other firms.  Stimulating firm entry is important because 
newly created (de novo) firms presumably enter the market with a more efficient mix of capital 
and labor, newer production technologies, and a more resourceful management.2 Functional 
factor markets are a crucial link in this process, as they provide nascent firms with the 
necessary resources to facilitate their growth. This study can be viewed as an empirical test 
of the overall efficiency of these factor markets, as the relationship between wages and 
productivity provide a unique metric for gauging the degree to which these markets are 
reallocating resources in an efficient manner. 
We should note that entry and exit plays an important role even in developed market 
economies – according to a 2002 OECD study, the net contribution to aggregate 
productivity growth from the entry and exit of firms typically accounts for between 20 and 
40 percent of total productivity growth in these economies (Scarpetta et al, 2002).  We may 
expect these effects to be especially important in transition economies: since entering firms 
are typically smaller in size than incumbents (Richter and Schaffer, 1996), they can correct 
the size imbalance of existing firms and shift economic activity from sectors which had been 
 
1 For example, during the 1980’s, the Yugoslav government granted massive soft-budget subsidies in the 
form of negative real interest rate loans (Kraft and Vodopivec, 1992).  
2 De novo firms are also presumably less likely to engage in dysfunctional behavior such as asset stripping 
or tunneling resources for personal gain (World Bank, 2002, p. 27). 
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favored by central planners, such as heavy industry, to more viable and previously neglected 
ones, such as the service industry.3
3.) Evidence on the effects of privatization 
Research on transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has 
generally confirmed the expected productivity effects associated with privatization (Djankov 
and Murrell, 2002).4 Studies have found the positive effects of privatization  across a wide 
range of  countries, including the Czech Republic (Zemplinerova et al, 1995; Claessens and 
Djankov, 1998), Hungary (Campbell, 2002), Estonia (Jones and Mygind, 2001), Romania 
(Earle and Telgedy, 2001), Slovenia (Smith et al, 1997; Konings and Xavier, 2003, Orazem 
and Vodopivec, 2003), and various cross country comparisons (Claessens et al., 1997; 
Frydman et al, 1998; Carlin et al, 2001).  For example, in their survey of seven CEE countries, 
Claessens et al (1997) find that total factor productivity growth following privatization 
increases by about 5 percent per year.  Earle and Telgedy (2001) find that privatized firms in 
Romania had an average growth rate that was 16% higher than state-owned ones, and Jones 
and Mygind (2001) find this figure to be on the order of 18% in their study of Estonian 
firms. 
Empirical results from studies of de novo firms offer inconclusive results on the 
productivity effects of these firms. In their survey of firms in 25 transition countries, Carlin 
et al (2001) find that average firm productivity growth was negative in de novo firms while it 
 
3 For example, comparing the sectoral distribution of employment across countries shows that Slovenia, 
like other Eastern European countries, placed excessive emphasis on industry: the fraction of the labor 
force employed in manufacturing and mining in 1981 was 42.6 percent in Slovenia, compared to 43.5 
percent in Hungary, 43.2 percent in Poland, and 30.7 percent in Western Europe ("Yearbook of Labor 
Statistics,” ILO Geneva 1981, in Mencinger, 1989). 
4 Djankov and Murrell (2002), in their extensive survey of the literature on the topic, also find that the 
“privatization effect is statistically insignificant in the Commonwealth of Independent States… these 
results are robust” (p. 4). 
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was positive in SOE’s and privatized firms.  However, they find clear size effects, with 
positive productivity growth recorded for de novo firms in the largest size class.5 In their 
study of Russian manufacturing firms, Richter and Schaffer (1996) find stronger evidence of 
positive performance among de novo firms. They find that while real output declined by 19 
percent among privatized firms in the 1993/94 period, it grew by 4 percent de novo firms, a 
result that was robust regardless of size.  This result is confirmed by Berkowitz and DeJong 
(2001), who find a strong positive relationship between regional entrepreneurial activity and 
regional economic growth in Russia.6
One significant bias inherent in the many of the above studies stems from the 
endogeneity of the decision to privatize a firm.  Particularly in countries which adopted a 
gradualist privatization strategy, the likelihood that a firm would be privatized was not 
independent of its general viability: viable firms were more likely to be privatized, which 
means that studies which do not account for this endogeneity will tend to overestimate the 
effects of privatization. This is certainly a concern for Slovenia, where the decision to 
privatize a firm was strongly influenced by its employees and management (who could 
purchase its shares at a 50% discount); employees in firms with poor prospects would be 
unlikely to support privatization in an attempt to preserve the firm’s soft budget constraint 
(World Bank, 1999). 
 Another significant problem with studies on the productivity of firms in transition 
economies is that none have, to the author’s knowledge, included detailed measures of labor 
quality in their production function. That is, in estimating firm level production functions 
and examining how efficiently firms produce output given their labor and capital inputs, they 
 
5 They mention that this may be the result of endogeneity: “Larger firms may be larger at the time of 
survey because they grew faster” (p. 11). 
6 They use the regional registry of small private enterprises per thousand inhabitants as a proxy for the 
presence of de novo firms, a rather imperfect measure. 
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have failed to account for the multiple qualitative dimensions along which workers may 
differ – for example, by education, experience, and seniority.7 As Griliches (1970) contends, 
this may introduce potentially serious bias in the estimated coefficients. It is particularly 
problematic in the context of transition economies, where firms of different ownership types 
(privatized, state-owned) and vintage (newly created vs. state-owned or formerly state-
owned) are likely to employ workers with differing demographic characteristics.  Studies 
which fail to account for worker quality are likely to overstate the productivity of privately 
owned firms relative to state-owned ones, since the higher prevailing wages in the private 
sector are likely to induce more qualified workers to exit the public sector. 
 
4.) Workers’ self-management 
In this section, I discuss the ways in which the Slovenian transition experience may 
be influenced by factors specific to its institutional environment under the socialist regime 
and the particular decentralized style of socialist planning that the government adopted after 
abolishing central planning in 1965. The legacy of workers’ self-management may imply 
specific labor market outcomes in which workers’ wages are inflated relative to their 
productivity. This section first examines the theoretical considerations, and then turns to the 
previous empirical research. Finally, I also briefly discuss the Slovenian transition experience 
to date, focusing especially on how we might expect it to impact the wage determination 
process. 
 
7 Alternatively, one could argue that such studies do allow for worker heterogeneity within individual 
firms, but assume that the proportions of these workers along various qualitative dimensions – for example, 
gender, education and seniority -- are equal across all firms, thus effectively rendering the labor quality 
terms irrelevant. Such an assumption is arguably similarly unrealistic.  
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4.1) Theory of workers’ self-management 
Workers’ self-management, the particular form of socialism Slovenia adopted as a 
constituent republic of Yugoslavia, deserves particular attention in the context of a 
discussion on firm productivity in Slovenia. Given the nature of the wage determination 
process in Slovenia, with the strong role of unions and long-term bargaining agreements, we 
might expect the salient features of self-managed firms to persist into early transition, thus 
contributing to their inefficiency and posing a barrier to restructuring.  And, as I outline 
below, we might expect that a self-managed firm would tend to operate at a lower level of 
employment, output and investment than the profit-maximizing capitalist firm.  
In the purest form of workers’ self-management, initially adopted in Yugoslavia in 
the 1950’s and 1960’s, the self-managed firm vested virtually complete control in its 
workers.8 Thus these workers, “in a one-man-one-vote basis, were the ultimate repository of 
economic decision making” (Granick, 1975, p. 336).  Workers elected the members of the 
workers’ council, which played the role of a capitalist firm’s board of directors – they 
designated the general director and the management board (which was charged with 
managing the firm’s daily operations).  The firm operated as an individual cooperative – net 
receipts, after deducting expenses other than wages, were divided between net investments 
and a wage fund distributed to the membership.  Thus, firms could choose to invest heavily 
at the expense of the current wage fund, hoping that they would increase future productivity 
– and thus the workers’ wages – through current sacrifices, or they could decide to disburse 
 
8 After 1972, state intervention in the firms’ operations increased, and restrictions were imposed upon 
firms’ ability to disburse profits through workers’ wages (Granick, 1975, and World Bank, 2004). 
Moreover, because bankruptcy was socially-undesirable and essentially non-existent (World Bank, 2004), 
firms operated under a soft-budget constraint (Kornai, 1980). In-effect, the profits of efficient firms were 
thus used to subsidize the losses of inefficient ones (Kraft and Vodopivec, 1992).  
Matija Vodopivec Wage and Productivity Differentials in Slovenia 
 
13
their entire profits to workers in the form of higher wages, allocating nothing to investment 
(Granick, 1975).  
Despite their great social appeal and democratic, egalitarian nature, worker managed 
firms may tend to have a propensity for allocative inefficiency and perverse economic 
behavior.  As first outlined by Ward (1958), we may expect the self-managed firm to pursue 
a set of incentives particular to its specific situation – instead of maximizing total profit, as a 
capitalist firm will in the long-run, a self-managed firm may attempt to maximize its profit 
per worker.  Assuming the self-managed firm has N types of labor which are perfectly 
substitutable inputs with potentially differing marginal products, we can formally express the 
objective function workers will attempt to maximize as 
 
Taking the derivative with respect to Li yields 
 
First order conditions require that  
 
or equivalently, that 
 
This outcome differs markedly from the outcome one expects from the capitalist firm. 
Consider again the standard profit function with N labor types 
 
Denoting the total wage bill as WB, we have 
 
Profit maximization requires that 
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Rearranging yields  
 
or equivalently, that  
 
and thus economic efficiency requires that the marginal revenue product equals the marginal 
cost of hiring each type of labor, given by the derivative of the wage bill with respect to Li.
These outcomes are clearly illustrated in Figure 1 below.  We see that whenever the 
Value Marginal Product of Labor (VMPL) is less than the Value Average Product of Labor 
(VAPL), the self-managed firm can increase VAPL by decreasing the number of workers 
employed. Conversely, whenever VMPL > VAPL, VAPL can be increased by increasing 
employment.  Thus, the self-managed firm will tend to operate at w= wself-managed and l= lself-
managed. A profit-maximizing firm, by contrast, will continue to hire labor as long as VMPL is 
greater than the equilibrium wage rate, weq, but not past leq since this would decrease total 
profits. Thus, as is evident from Figure 1, wself-managed > weq and lself-managed < leq.
Matija Vodopivec Wage and Productivity Differentials in Slovenia 
 
15
wself-managed
weq
lself--managed leq 
VAPL
Labor demand curve for 
profit-maximizing firm 
Figure 1: Wage-employment outcomes under workers’ self-management 
VMPL
Wage
Level of 
Employment
Moreover, a firm’s incentive to distribute its surplus in the form of wages is even 
stronger given that part of the firm’s surplus is retained by the government. Many 
economists have argued that this led to the so-called “underinvestment problem” in 
Yugoslavia, whereby firms did not reinvest profits they otherwise may have due to short 
time-horizons and the exacerbating effects of government intervention (Bonin and 
Putterman, 1987).  Thus, we would expect that self-managed firms will be inefficient both in 
the short- and the long-run: in the short-run, because they do not operate at the efficient 
frontier, and efficiency gains could be reaped through reductions in slack and increasing 
employment; and in the long-run, because sub-optimal levels of investment lead to 
antiquated technology and equipment and insufficient capital.9 Also, we would expect that 
VMPL would tend to be higher in the self-managed firm than in its capitalist counterpart. 
 
9 In addition, there are many other theoretical predictions on the perverse behavior of self-managed firms– 
for example, “increases in the relative scarcity of a commodity actually signal suppliers to reduce their 
production of it, generating allocative inefficiency” (Estrin, 1983, p. 21).  
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4.2) Research on self-managed firms and formerly self-managed firms in transition 
Competing views on of workers’ self-management have spawned an abundance of 
empirical research on the subject, with authors attempting to attribute firm inefficiencies and 
the large wage dispersion found in workers’ self-managed economies to various factors 
(Bonin and Putterman, 1987; Prašnikar and Svejnar, 1991). While the majority of this 
research focuses on the pre-1991 period when Slovenia was still a part of Yugoslavia, the 
extremely slow pace of reform in Slovenia suggests that many of its characteristics are likely 
to persist in the early transition period.  
A large number of studies on productivity under workers’ self-management focus on 
the under-investment problem, attributing variations in earnings and efficiency to the capital 
allocation process and the fact that firms were not required to pay the full opportunity cost 
for capital previously allocated to them by planners.  Thus, for example, Vanek and Jovcic 
(1975) contend that differing levels of investment between firms, evidenced by significant 
variation in capital to labor ratio across otherwise similar firms, are the most important 
factor in explaining wage dispersions, while factors such as concentration ratios have little 
impact on them.  Other researchers focus more on the endogeneity of worker earnings and 
use differences in labor productivity to explain wage dispersion.  Wachtel (1973), for 
example, using industry level productivity data from 1956 to 1968, finds that average 
earnings are closely related to labor productivity at the industry level.10 In fact, he finds that 
two variables – labor productivity and industry concentration – explain as much as 81 
percent of the variation in mean earnings in certain years.   Still other authors offering 
competing views, contending that theoretical models of workers’ self-management have 
 
10 Estrin (1983) finds similar results. 
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been rendered useless since the 1970’s because of increased government intervention in firm 
behavior – Prašnikar and Svejnar (1991), for example, find that “there is evidence that, in the 
past two decades, income determination in Yugoslav firms has reflected political rather than 
self-management forces” (p. 35).11
The empirical literature on the behavior of formerly self-managed firms during the 
transition period is comparatively sparse. Prašnikar and Svejnar (2003), analyzing a panel of 
Slovenian firms over the 1991-1995 period, find that many firms – particularly those 
eventually privatized to insiders – tended to exhibit a tradeoff between investment and wages 
(as the Ward model would predict).  Moreover, workers in (frequently loss-making) firms 
which were not headed by elite, powerful managers and which were privatized to outsiders 
also appeared to engage in some surplus sharing (which they infer from the higher wages of 
workers in these firms). Overall, Prašnikar and Svejnar (2003) thus find that many of the 
salient features of workers’ self-management were still observable in certain groups of firms 
in early transition. 
It is important to note that, due mainly to a lack of suitable data, the above studies 
tend to focus on corollaries that do not directly address the central propositions outlined by 
Ward (1958) – that the wages of workers in self-managed firms will tend to be inflated 
relative to what their marginal revenue product would warrant. That is, while questions such 
as sub-optimal levels of investment are, to a certain degree, important in their own right, 
they are ultimately relevant insomuch as they affect total factor productivity (and wages) in 
the long run. For example, the so-called “underinvestment problem” is deemed problematic 
because, in the long-run, sub-optimal levels of investment lead to an antiquated capital stock 
 
11 Estrin and Svejnar (1993) as well as Prašnikar, Svejnar et al (1994) corroborate this view, finding that the 
appropriation of capital rents by workers does not account for high interindustry earnings differentials 
during the same period. 
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that translates into lower total factor productivity.12 Studies that analyze the underinvestment 
productivity, in effect, use current investment as a proxy for future productivity, but do not 
yield conclusions that are directly translatable into tangible economic effects. By contrast, the 
approach used in this study, which directly compares wage and productivity differentials 
across different types of firms, overcomes these shortcomings. 
 
5.) Institutional considerations 
As discussed above, the Slovenian economy operated under a particular style of 
socialism that differed from the Soviet-type command economy in that it maintained a quasi-
market economy with flexible prices and open unemployment (World Bank, 2004).  
Although the theory section described above assumed a relatively pure system of workers 
self-management, the reality is that by the late 1980’s, there was extensive political 
interference in firm decisions regarding investment, employment and wages.  Firms operated 
with soft-budget constraints in which a massive system of discretionary taxes and transfers 
taxed away net revenue from profitable enterprises in order to subsidize failing firms. As 
such, inefficient firms could lose money indefinitely, while efficient firms could not build up 
reserves that could allow expansion (Orazem and Vodopivec, 2003). 
Since seceding from Yugoslavia and beginning the transition to a market economy in 
1991, the Slovenian government adopted a gradualist approach to reform relative to other 
transition economies (World Bank, 2002). The legal process for privatizing large state 
enterprises began in 1993; privatization itself was initiated in 1994 and continues today 
despite several waves of privatization, with almost 50 percent of output still controlled by 
 
12 Similarly, the sub-optimal levels of employment predicted by the Ward hypothesis would also translate 
into lower levels of total factor productivity. 
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the state (World Bank, 2004). Although the reform process was expedited by Slovenia’s 
accession to the European Union in May 2004, many pressing reforms still need to be 
carried out, particularly in the banking and financial services sectors (IMAD, 2005). 
Matija Vodopivec Wage and Productivity Differentials in Slovenia 
 
20
Chapter II: Effects of Transition on Productivity and Wage Differentials 
across Different Types of Workers 
1.) Introduction 
 For workers in economies undergoing the transition from a plan to market, the past 
decade and a half has been a turbulent period.  Under the previous regimes, they had 
enjoyed generous benefits such as guaranteed employment and job security, socially-
mandated minimum wages, and numerous fringe benefits, such as extended vacations in 
company-owned vacation houses.  Moreover, their governments had been – at least 
nominally – committed to wage equality for all workers.  Since the onset of transition, 
however, governments have been progressively abandoning their previously paternalistic 
roles and granting firms greater freedom with their employment policies, allowing them 
discretion in the process of hiring and laying off workers, creating and destroying jobs, and 
deciding on their wage regimes.  In the process, some workers have suffered long 
unemployment spells or sharp earnings declines; some have retired early or temporarily left 
the labor force to work at home or upgrade skills; and some have switched occupation, 
industry, or residency; all with considerable disruption to the lives and jobs of family 
members. 
 Of course, these changes have come as part of a larger set of liberalization and 
marketization reforms aimed at improving the competitiveness of the economy.  One 
underlying premise has been that such reforms will lead to outcomes consistent with what 
we would expect to see in a developed market economy – with higher levels of labor 
productivity and wages which roughly correspond to the marginal revenue product posited 
by economic theory.  Despite a voluminous body of literature examining a variety of labor 
market issues – ranging from analyses of wage differentials to studies on worker and job 
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flows – this fundamental relationship between wages and productivity remains untested 
empirically.   
In this paper, I use a novel approach proposed by Hellerstein, Neumark and Troske 
(1999) to conduct a direct empirical test of the relationship between relative wages and the 
marginal productivity of workers.  This allows us to examine several pressing questions 
regarding the impact of transition on the labor market.  For example, to what extent have 
the increased returns to education during transition reflected growth in labor productivity, 
and to what extent do they reflect a liberalization of the forced wage compression under the 
previous regime?13 How can we explain the narrowing wage gap in transition economies – 
has the marginal productivity of women increased relative to men?14 Finally, how have older 
workers coped with the changing skills and knowledge required in a modern market 
economy – have they been able to adjust their skills, judging by the productivity differentials 
of older workers relative to younger ones? 
 Using an unusually rich administrative database containing employer-employee 
matched data spanning a ten-year period, this study examines the wage and productivity 
differentials among different types of workers in Slovenia.15 The results offer unprecedented 
empirical insight into the dynamic relationship between relative wages and marginal 
productivity throughout the transition process. The results indicate that wage and 
productivity differentials have been progressively converging over the transition period, 
 
13 For example, Vodopivec (1993) finds that in a Yugoslav firm with several thousand workers, the pay of 
the highest manager was only 4.54 times that of the lowest paid worker.  
14 In a survey on the topic, Brainerd (2000) finds that, with the exception of Russia and the Ukraine, 
women’s relative wages have consistently increased across Eastern Europe during the transition process. 
15 Having abolished central planning in 1965 in favor of workers’ self-management, a quasi-market type 
economy with flexible prices, the problems that the former Yugoslav republics faced at the onset of 
transition were arguably less severe than in other transition economies (where central planning was not 
abolished until the collapse of socialism).  However, most of the salient features of socialist economies – 
for example, guaranteed job security, state ownership of the means of production, soft-budget constraints – 
were also present in Slovenia. 
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indicating that market liberalization is in fact becoming a reality. They also show that older 
workers have lagged considerably behind younger workers in acquiring the skills that the 
new economic conditions demand of them, as witnessed by the precipitous fall in their 
marginal productivities over the past decade.  Moreover, the increased returns to education 
over the transition period reflect genuine productivity growth and not simply a liberalization 
of the previously forced wage compression, and we can thus be expect that the returns to 
education may continue to increase in the future. 
In what follows, I first present an overview of several wage determination theories in 
Section 2.  This provides a theoretical framework for a discussion of the measurement 
problems inherent in empirical tests of the relationship between wages and productivity, 
which is the subject of Section 3. Section 4 briefly discusses the institutional considerations 
specific to the Slovenia. (Methodological issues, a description of the data used in the analysis, 
and a presentation of the results are the subject of the concluding chapter, Chapter III.)  
 
2.) Wage Determination Theories 
 There are many competing theories on how an individual’s characteristics affect their 
productivity and determine their wages (see Hutchens, 1989, for a survey).  Generally 
speaking, the most established theory of wage determination – the human capital theory – 
posits that worker productivity closely corresponds to the degree of education, training and 
experience that person has accumulated (Becker, 1962).  When an individual is acquiring 
firm-specific capital, human capital theory predicts a wage which exceeds marginal 
productivity because the firm will incur the costs of training the individual firm-specific 
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skills.16 In order to recoup these costs, the productivity profile of the individual is steeper 
than the wage profile, and thus productivity exceeds wages as seniority increases.  If the skills 
gained through experience are not firm specific but general, then the wage and productivity 
profiles should be more similar. In both cases, human capital theory implies that wages grow 
with seniority because productivity grows with seniority. 
 Alternative theories of job tenure dispute this contention. Implicit contract theory 
(Lazear, 1979) maintains that wage determination should also be understood in terms of the 
agency problems facing an employer.  It argues that employers and employees may enter 
implicit contracts whereby at the beginning of employment, workers are paid less than the 
value of the marginal of labor, whereas the opposite is true after employees have stayed with 
the employer for a long period of time.  Such wage policy discourages shirking in situations 
where employee effort is difficult to monitor, because honest and hard-working employees – 
who are less likely to be fired in the long run – will be rewarded with a wage premium in the 
years leading up to their retirement. This theory predicts that wages may grow with job 
tenure even when productivity decreases with seniority. 
 Theories of job matching also offer alternative predictions on wage determination 
(Jovanovic, 1979).  These theories are based on the idea that imperfect information exists on 
both sides of the market about the exact location of one’s optimal job assignment. After an 
initial job assignment, new information is available about an individual’s skills and 
preferences, and a job separation may be mutually beneficial for the employer and employee.  
Thus, matches that turn out ex post to be good survive longer and lead to longer tenure at a 
 
16 Various alternative flavors of this general approach have been proposed. Lazear(2003), for example, 
proposes a “skill-weights” human capital theory whereby virtually all skills acquired on the job are general, 
but firms vary in their weighting of these skills. Returns to tenure are explained as the result of the value 
firms place on the particular set of more specific skills and knowledge individuals develop with longer 
tenure, and wage losses upon employment with another firm are explained as a result of an inferior job 
match.  
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firm.  Employers may use steep earnings profiles to sort out workers and accelerate the 
process of job matching.  
 The wage determination process may be viewed in light of market imperfections 
which result from either discrimination or imperfect labor market competition (e.g. 
collective bargaining agreements).  In the case of the first, if employers exhibit a distaste for 
employing workers with certain demographic characteristics (for example, women), the 
equilibrium outcome will be one in which such workers are paid less than the marginal 
revenue product of their labor (Becker, 1971) – that is, a wage differential will arise large 
enough to induce employers to hire workers from this demographic group.  In the case of 
imperfectly competitive labor markets, labor unions may negotiate collective bargaining 
agreements which mandate minimum wages based on a worker’s characteristics such as age, 
seniority, education, and so forth.  In both cases, a workers’ wage may be unrelated to his or 
her productivity within the firm. 
 The impact of an individual’s education on productivity can be explained by two 
theories, human capital theory and signaling theory.  Human capital theory posits that 
additional education increases the productive capacity of the individual through the 
acquisition of knowledge and skills required to perform more complex jobs.  It thus predicts 
a causal relationship between education and productivity which is reflected in higher wages.  
In the context of transition, human capital theory predicts that older workers may possess 
human capital that is obsolete, and thus that ceteris paribus, older, well-educated workers will 
be less productive than their younger counterparts. Signaling theory (Spence, 1973), by 
contrast, views education merely as a screening process through which individuals can signal 
their skills to potential employers. Employers use education as a proxy for ability with which 
they detect the best candidates in a heterogeneous applicant pool and overcome the 
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informational asymmetry inherent in the labor market.  Hence, signaling theory predicts that 
educated individuals will be more productive not because of the skills and knowledge they 
have acquired during the course of their education, but because of their superior abilities. In 
the context of transition, signaling theory implies that even educated older workers will be 
able to adapt to the changing skills and knowledge demanded in a market economy since 
their education is a sign of latent abilities or intellectual capacities.    
3) Measurement issues and Empirical Evidence  
The empirical evidence examining the relationship between wages and productivity 
has largely yielded inconclusive results (Hutchens, 1989). While a large number of studies 
have been conducted on the topic, the validity of many of them has been questioned because 
of the measurement issues that most fail to fully address.  Ideally, modeling the relationship 
between wages and productivity would entail relating an individual workers’ wage with that 
worker’s effect, at the margin, on the firm’s total output.  The most significant problem 
facing studies which attempt to link these two factors is that, while measuring an individual 
workers’ wage is relatively straightforward, obtaining a meaningful estimate of his or her 
marginal productivity is usually not.  
This problem can be most easily overcome by studying situations where the nature 
of the production process is such that an individual’s output is easily measured (Lazear, 
2003). The results of such studies generally confirm the hypotheses of the human capital 
model and theories of job matching.   Thus, for example, in his study of glass installers in an 
auto glass manufacturing plant, Lazear (2000) finds significant tenure effects, with strong 
evidence of both on-the-job learning and sorting, with high separation rates amongst 
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unproductive workers.17 Paarsch and Shearer (1997), as well as Fernie and Metcalf (1996), 
find similar results.   In general, however, researchers have resorted to rather imperfect 
proxies for marginal productivity.   
 However, quantifying the marginal productivity of workers with differing 
demographic characteristics is much more difficult for the majority of jobs in an advanced 
industrial society, where heterogeneous workers are often complementary inputs in the 
production process, and several different approaches have been proposed. One proxy for 
productivity is employee performance evaluations.  Medoff and Abraham (1980), in their 
study of two large U.S. manufacturing corporations, find that increased wages that came 
about with longer tenure were not associated with improved performance ratings.  They 
interpret this as evidence discrediting the human capital model, as the wage and productivity 
models appear to differ. However, their results are suspect for two reasons. Firstly, 
psychologists have long pointed to the numerous biases of job performance ratings which 
arise from factors such as halo error, positive leniency, and random response error 
(Viswesveran et al, 2005), making them suspect from a measurement point of view.  
Secondly, such studies may yield different, but equally valid, interpretations.  For example, 
Dohman (2004), who replicates the methodology in Medoff and Abraham (1980), using 
personnel data from a Dutch aircraft manufacturer and finds similar results, contends that 
such results can arise even when wage and productivity profiles are similar, arguing that as 
workers are promoted, their relative performance ratings fall, but increase with tenure in a 
given position – a result that finds empirical support in his data.  Thus, performance 
evaluations appear to be a generally inaccurate proxy for productivity. 
 
17 The estimated effects are on the order of 34% per year, a figure that can be explained by the high worker 
turnover rate – the average tenure length is 8 months.  
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 A relatively new framework for analyzing the relationship between marginal 
productivity of workers and their relative wages – and the one used in this study – is the one 
proposed by Hellerstein, Neumark and Troske (1999).  Using plant-level data which includes 
detailed data on the demographic characteristics of the labor force, they jointly estimate an 
augmented production function with a quality of labor term and with a plant-level wage bill 
equation. (Since their methodology is also used in this paper, the details of their exposition 
are relegated to the methodology discussion in Section 3). Their results enable them to 
directly compare wage and productivity differentials (although the nature of their data does 
not permit them to classify workers into very specific groups). They find that, ceteris 
paribus, the marginal productivity of workers aged 35-54 is 15 percent greater than that of 
their counterparts who are younger than 35, and that the older workers’ wages are 19 percent 
greater (the four percent difference is statistically insignificant). This result is in line with 
human capital theory’s predictions.  Another of their findings, however, supports the 
discrimination hypothesis, as the gender wage gap – whereby, according to their estimates, 
women earn 45 percent less than men – is not justified by women’s 16 percent lower 
marginal productivity (a statistically significant difference). 
Similar studies have been carried out by Hellerstein and Neumark (1999), Haegeland 
and Klette (1999), Jones (2001), Crepon, Deniau, and Perez-Duarte (2002), and Illmakunnas 
et al (2004). Their results are summarized in Table 1 below for comparison (note that S and 
T respectively refer to the productivity and wage differentials of the specified group relative 
to the omitted group): 
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Table 1: Empirical evidence from joint estimates of productivity (S) and wage (T) differentials 
 Country Coefficients on 
Female dummies 
Coefficients on 
Education/Skill 
dummies 
Coefficients on other 
dummies 
N
Hellerstein, 
Neumark and 
Troske (1999) 
USA S = 0.84, T = 0.55 
(difference is 
statistically 
significant) 
… Aged 35-54: 
S = 1.15,  T = 1.19 
Aged 50+: 
S = 1.19,  T = 1.18 
(Base group: under 35 
years of age) 
3,102 
Hellerstein and 
Neumark (1999) 
Israel S =0.8, T = 0.75 
(difference between 
T and S not 
statistically 
significant) 
Technical engineers: 
S = 2.0,  T = 1.7 
Engineers: 
S = 4.0,  T = 2.25 
(Base group: unskilled 
workers) 
… 998 
Haegeland and 
Klette (1999) 
Norway S =0.83, T = 0.82 
(difference between 
T and S not 
statistically 
significant) 
Low Education: 
S = 1.10, T = 1.20 
Medium Education: 
S = 1.55,  T = 1.50 
High Education: 
S = 1.80,  T = 1.82 
(Base group: less than 
11 years of education) 
8-15 years of experience: 
S = 1.62,  T = 1.39 
15 + years of experience: 
S = 1.33,  T = 1.38 
(Base group: less than 8 
years of experience) 
7,122 
Jones (2001) Ghana S = 0.45, T = 0.86 
(difference between 
T and S not 
statistically 
significant) 
Primary schooling: 
S = 1.08,  T = 1.3 
Secondary schooling: 
S = 1.54,  T = 1.56 
Tertiary schooling:  
S = 1.79,  T = 1.56 
(Base group: no 
primary school) 
… 278 for 
S’s, 
1211 
for T’s 
Crepon, Deniau, 
and Perez-
Duarte (2002)* 
France S = .89, T = 0.86 
(difference between 
T and S not 
statistically 
significant) 
Skilled:  
S = 1.20,  T = 1.17 
Highly skilled: S =
1.88,  T = 1.73 
(Base group: unskilled 
workers) 
Aged 25-35:  
S = 1.22,  T = 1.23 
Aged 35-50:  
S = 1.10,  T = 1.27 
Aged 50+:  
S = 1.11,  T = 1.41 
(Base group: less than 25 
years old) 
23,292 
Illmakunnas, 
Maliranta and 
Vainiomaki 
(2004)* 
Finland … … 2-5 years tenure:  
S = 1.04,  T = 1.03 
5-10 years tenure: S =
1.0,  T = 1.05 
11-20 years tenure: S =
.95,  T = 1.07 
(Base group: 1-2 years 
tenure) 
28,737 
Notes: (*) indicates statistics which refer to imputed values based on author’s calculations.  The coefficients 
should be interpreted based on whether they are different from 1. For example, estimates of S = 1.25 and T =
1.35 for women would indicate that the MPL of women is 25 percent greater than that of men, while their 
wages are 35 percent greater. 
 
Several stylized facts emerge from these findings.  First, the marginal productivity of 
women is consistently lower than that of men, as the estimates for S generally range from 
Matija Vodopivec Wage and Productivity Differentials in Slovenia 
 
29
0.75 to 0.9.  The estimates for women’s wage differentials appear to be slightly lower than 
their productivity differentials, although we cannot conclude this with certainty because the 
difference tends to be statistically insignificant (and thus we cannot interpret the disparity as 
conclusive evidence of discrimination).  Second, better educated workers are more 
productive, with the most educated (skilled) workers approximately twice as productive as 
the least educated (skilled).  Their wage differentials also appear to be slightly lower than 
their productivity would warrant, indicating a certain degree of wage compression.  Thirdly, 
the evidence on the effects of job tenure and age are inconclusive, but we may tentatively say 
that the marginal productivity with respect to age or tenure appears to be negative past a 
certain point in workers’ careers. 
 Although much of the empirical evidence discussed above appears to favor the 
human capital model, we should recognize that this model is nevertheless quite incomplete 
in that it still fails to explain a large portion of the variation in wages. In standard earnings 
equations for individuals of the same race and sex in the United States, for example, between 
two-thirds and four-fifths of the variance of the natural logarithm of wages is unexplained 
after accounting for the factors which are included in these models – factors such as age, 
years of schooling, labor market experience, and parental characteristics (Bowles, Gintis, and 
Osborne, 2001).  Studies have found that many seemingly irrelevant factors – including 
personal characteristics such as beauty, height, obesity and even whether one keeps a clean 
house – can often be robust predictors of wages (Bowles et al, 2001). We should thus bear in 
mind that although the methodology used in joint estimations of productivity and wage 
differentials may offer the best estimates on the relationship between wages and productivity 
to date, the data used in these studies appear to exclude some intangible, unobservable 
factors we have yet to fully understand. 
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4.) Institutional Considerations  
Under socialism, the wage determination process in Yugoslavia was highly regulated 
by the government, which set each firms’ total wage bill.  A firm’s wage scale was 
determined by a referendum of its employees, and the resulting distribution of wages was 
highly compressed in comparison to capitalist firms (Haltiwanger and Vodopivec, 2003).  In 
1991, the government passed legislation formally removing these governmental 
administrative constraints, and since then collective bargaining agreements – which are 
legally binding for all firms – have played a major role in the wage determination process.  
These collective bargaining agreements mandate minimum pay scales based on an 
individual’s education (for example, those with a Ph.D must be paid at least 3 times the 
minimum wage), seniority (they specify that an individual must receive at least a 0.5 percent 
wage increase for each additional year of tenure), and hours which must count as overtime.  
Despite the high level of disaggregation in the collective bargaining agreements, the system 
allows for idiosyncratic deviations in wages, which may arise on a firm-specific or even a 
worker-specific basis, since the collective bargaining agreement generally only sets a wage 
floor. Empirical results indicate that the system still allows for considerable flexibility in the 
wage determination process in practice (Haltiwanger and Vodopivec, 2003), and thus we 
may expect to find evidence of sizable competitive forces acting in the labor market.
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Chapter III – Methodology, Actual Data, and Results 
 
1) General methodological approach 
In this section, I outline the methodology used in this study and contrast it with 
conventional approaches used in studies on wage determination and firm productivity.  Note 
that, generally speaking, the literature on these two topics has previously been confined to 
separate studies in the spheres of labor and industrial economics, respectively, due mainly to 
a limited availability of data which would link them together.  I also discuss the limitations of 
these studies in obtaining accurate estimates of productivity.  
Typical studies on wage determination focus on wage regressions of individual level 
data. Using the log-linear model with wages as the dependent variable, these models examine 
the wage differentials attributed to various worker characteristics such as gender, age, 
seniority, and so forth. Thus, such models follow the functional form introduced by Mincer 
(1974), which can be written as 
 
ln w = W0 + SUM(i=0, n) WiDi + X
where ln w is the logarithm of wages, W0 is the constant term and D is a vector of individual 
characteristics such as gender, education, work experience, seniority, and so forth.  
 The problem with using this approach to test theories on wage determination is that, 
without independent measures of productivity differentials, it is difficult to determine 
whether wage differentials associated with worker characteristics actually reflect differences 
in productivity or whether they arise from other factors, such as market imperfections in the 
form of sticky wages or discrimination.  Also, in the absence of corresponding information 
of productivity, it is difficult to verify which theory of wage determination (e.g. human 
capital theory, implicit contract theory) has the most empirical support in the data. 
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The approach used in this study draws heavily on the model pioneered by 
Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999), in which production functions and wage equations 
are estimated jointly, allowing for direct comparisons of the wage and productivity 
differentials.  I briefly review their methodology, and examine how the availability of 
additional control variables for ownership type can add to this framework.   
 
1.1) Actual model for estimating productivity differentials 
Consider a simple production function in which value-added output Y is a function 
of capital inputs K and a quality of labor aggregate QL.  Using a translog production 
function, the model can be described as 
 
lnY=ln(A) + Z ln(K) + W ln(QL) + g(K,QL) + [iXi + µ (1) 
 
where g(K,QL) represent the second order terms of the translog production function 
(Jorgensen et al, 1973), [iXi is a vector of dummy variables capturing firm characteristics 
such as ownership type and industry, and µ is the stochastic error term. 
 For each plant, assume for simplicity that we can differentiate workers based on a 
single characteristic, their gender. Assuming the workers are perfectly substitutable inputs 
with potentially different marginal products, we can define QL as 
 
QL=L(1+ (SF-1) F/L)    (2) 
 
were L is the total number of workers in the plant, F is the number of women in the plant, 
and SF is the marginal productivity of women relative to men.  Substituting equation (2) into 
equation (1) yields a plant level production from which SF can be estimated. 
 The actual data permit us to distinguish the each plants workforce not only based on 
gender, but also by education, job tenure, and age. Workers are classified into six education 
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groups (completed elementary school, vocational school, high school, 2-year college, and at 
least 4-year college), three categories of tenure length (less than 2 years, 2-5 years, more than 
5 years), and four age categories (less than 30 years old, 30-39, 40-49, more than 50 years 
old). A firm’s workforce can thus be fully described by each of the 144 possible 
combinations that these multiple dimensions can capture, and obtaining exact estimates for 
each of these groups would require including 144 terms for the productivity differentials 
(S‘s) in the production function. 
 In order to reduce the dimensionality of the problem, a simplifying restriction on the 
model is imposed. I restrict the productivity differentials of workers in one demographic 
category to be equal for those same types of workers in another demographic category. 
Thus, for example, I assume that the productivity differentials of young women (those in the 
first age category, less than 30 years old) relative to young men is equal to the productivity 
differentials of the oldest women (those more than 50 years old) relative to the oldest men.  
Similarly, the productivity differentials of the youngest women relative to the oldest women 
are constrained to be equal to the productivity differentials of the youngest men relative to 
the oldest men.  With these simplifying restrictions, the quality of labor term becomes 
 
QL = [L + (1+( SF -1) F] · [1 + (SEDU2-1) EDU2 + (SEDU3-1) EDU3 + (SEDU4-1) EDU4 
+ (SEDU5-1) EDU5 + (SEDU6-1) EDU6]  ·  [1 + (SAGE2-1) AGE2 + (SAGE3-1) AGE3 + 
(SAGE4-1) AGE4]  ·  [1 + (STENURE2-1) TENURE2 + (STENURE3-1) TENURE3]  
 
(3) 
 
where EDU2-EDU6 reflect the number of workers with completed elementary school, 
vocational school, high school, 2-year college, and at least 4-year college, respectively; 
AGE2, AGE3 and AGE4 reflect the number of workers aged 30-39, 40-49, and over 50 
years, respectively; and TENURE2 and TENURE3 reflect the number of workers with 2-5 
and more than 5 years of tenure at the present firm, respectively. Note that because of the 
way the coefficients are defined, productivity differentials between different groups should 
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be interpreted based on whether the coefficients are different from one, and not zero. Thus, 
a finding that SF = 1.25 would imply that women are 25% more productive than men. 
1.2) Actual model for estimating wage differentials 
 In order for the wage differentials to be directly comparable to the productivity 
differentials in the model described above, the model used in this study deviates from those 
typically used in studies analyzing the determinants of wages. Again, this study emulates the 
model used by Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999), and is briefly outlined below. 
 For the purposes of explaining the model, assume again that workers can be 
differentiated based on only one demographic characteristic, their gender. Since we have 
matched employer-employee data containing information on each person’s earnings in a 
given year, we can come up with a total wage bill for employers if we sum up the individual 
level earnings.  That is, we begin by considering the individual level-wage equations in levels 
 
wi,j =wM Mi,j + wF Fi,j (3) 
 
where Mi and Fi are dummy variables for men and women, respectively, for the i-th worker 
in plant j, and wM and wF are the individual  wages of men and women.  Summing this 
equation over all workers yields plant level wage bills, which can be expressed as 
 
w =wM (L - F) + wF F (4) 
 
Defining TF as the relative wage of women to men (TF = wM/wF), we have 
 
w = wM (L - F) + TF wM F = wM (L + (TF – 1) F) (4) 
 
or, equivalently,  
 
ln(w) = ln(wM (L + (TF – 1) F)) (5) 
 
Equation (5) thus yields estimates of wage differentials that are directly comparable to the 
marginal productivity differentials obtained from (1). 
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Since I have data on workers’ wages based not only on their gender but also based on the 
other characteristics described above, the actual equation that I estimate is 
 
ln(w)  = ln (wbase)+  ln [(1+( TF -1) F] · [1 + (TEDU2-1) EDU2 + (TEDU3-1) EDU3 + (TEDU4-
1) EDU4 + (TEDU5-1) EDU5 + (TEDU6-1) EDU6]  ·  [1 + (TAGE2-1) AGE2 + (TAGE3-1) 
AGE3 + (TAGE4-1) AGE4]  ·  [1 + (TTENURE2-1) TENURE2 + (TTENURE3-1) TENURE3] + 
[iXi + µ
(6) 
 
where wbase is the wage of individuals in the omitted group, the wage differential coefficients 
T correspond to their respective definitions for equation (3), [iXi is a vector of dummy 
variables capturing firm characteristics such as ownership type and industry, and µ is the 
stochastic error term. 
Estimating the equation in (5) along with the augmented production function in (1) 
then yields directly comparable measures of marginal productivity (S) and wage differentials 
(T).  Note that the restrictions of equiproportionate distributions of wage differentials across 
varying demographic characteristics are retained as in (3), and that the coefficients again 
need to be interpreted based on whether they differ from 1, and not 0.     
 
2.) The Data 
The actual data used in this study are from a comprehensive panel of Slovenian 
firms from 1992 until 2001 and comprehensive matching individual level data for these firms 
(see Table 2 below for data sources). The data include all registered legal businesses in the 
business sector from 1992 until 2001; thus, for each year, the firm level data contains 
between 21,046 and 38,454 observations (see Appendix 1 for details).  In order to construct 
a matched employer-employee database, the worker- and firm-level databases were merged 
according to the universal firm identifier codes used for tax purposes.  Because the firm-level 
data contained information on the number of workers employed in the firm, it was possible 
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to ensure that a sufficient number of workers were matched to a firm so that the sample 
could be used to make reliable inferences about the demographic characteristics of the firm’s 
workforce.  Due to errors in the identifiers and lapses in the data, a considerable number of 
observations were lost in the process; after merging the worker and firm level data, the 
resulting matched employer-employee database contained information on the firms which 
employed between 73.8 and 53.4 percent of the workforce.   
For each firm and year it was in operation, the resulting data include the following 
variables: 
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Table 2: Data Sources and Variables Used in the Empirical Model 
Variable Basis for calculation Values taken by variable Data source 
Output revenues plus net change in inventories, 
where applicable 
Positive integers 
number of 
workers 
employeda
Number of hours worked based on yearly 
number 
Positive integers 
Capitala value of tangible fixed assets based on 
historical cost accounting 
Positive values 
Materials cost of goods sold, where applicable  Positive integers 
Location Urban or Rural location Dummy if rural 
 
Agency of the 
Republic of 
Slovenia for 
Public Statistics 
and Services  
Accounting 
Register 
Ownership type State or Private (includes foreign and 
domestic ownership) 
Dummy if majority private-owned 
Foreign 
ownership 
Capital origin Dummy if majority foreign- owned 
Statistical Office 
of Slovenia 
Business Register 
Firm wage bill Worker-level data Positive values 
Share of women Worker-level data Ratio between 0 and 1 
Employment 
shares by 
education  
Worker-level data Ratio between 0 and 1 
Employment 
shares by age 
Worker-level data Ratio between 0 and 1 
Employment 
shares by job 
tenure 
Worker-level data Ratio between 0 and 1 
 
Statistical Office 
of Slovenia 
Working 
Population 
Register 
Entry Firm data (7-digit firm identifiers) Dummy if firm exits between 1992 
and 2001 
Exit Firm data (7-digit firm identifiers) Dummy if firm enters between 
1992 and 2001 
Herfindahl indexb Slovenian activity codes and data on output 0 (perfect competition) to 
1(monopoly) 
Overall firm 
turnover ratec
Slovenian activity codes and  data on entry, 
exit 
0 (no entry or exit) to 2 (all firms 
enter and exit) 
 
Own calculations 
Note: Because not all firms were in operation for entire year, output and materials were adjusted for the 
number of months firm was in operation (data thus represent simulated yearly data).  Data on output, materials 
and capital were deflated based on the respective deflators from the Statistical Office of Slovenia price index 
reports (1991-2001). The identifying variables used to merge data from different sources were a universal 7-
digit firm identifier and the relevant year. 
a A large number of companies with no employees or capital existed in the early 1990’s as more liberal 
legislation made it easy to establish a new company (Hrovatin and Uršia,, 2002).  These companies were 
fictitious; they never de facto performed business operations, but rather were established for tax-avoidance 
purposes. As such, they were excluded from the data. 
b The Herfindahl index measures the degree of competition based on the output shares of firms. It is defined as 
where Sj is the share of firm j in sectoral output in the sample of n firms in the sector. Two-digit sectors are 
used to define the respective market (they are based on the Slovenian classification, but are roughly analogous 
to the SIC classifications).  
c Following Scarpetta et al (2002), the overall firm turnover rate is defined as the sum of the entry and exit rate, 
where the entry rate is the number of new firms divided by the total number of incumbent and entrant firms in 
a given year, and the exit rate is the number of firms exiting the market in a given year divided by the 
incumbents in the previous year. 
 
Matija Vodopivec Wage and Productivity Differentials in Slovenia 
 
38
 The data suffer from several shortcomings. The capital stock is measured by 
historical cost instead of its market value, which is problematic given Slovenia’s socialist 
legacy.  Like many studies using statistical records, no distinction can be made “between 
new-startups and small firms that emerge from restitution, spinoffs from state-owned 
enterprises, or other forms of privatization” (Brada, 1996, p. 75).  Finally, the valuations of 
output and material inputs originate from markets where monopoly power is likely to exist – 
as a transition market economy that still needs to further liberalize its markets, significant 
(although decreasing) monopolistic markups are likely to exist throughout the Slovenian 
economy. As a result, interpreting estimates of productivity differentials can be problematic 
because they may reflect markups due to imperfect competition instead of actual 
productivity levels (Basu and Fernald, 1995). We may thus mistakenly attribute to 
productivity increases what is in fact caused by increases in market power. 
Fortunately, at least the latter problem can be partially corrected.  If we include 
measures of sector-level competition in the model, we can control for increases in revenues 
that result from imperfect competition and thus attempt to capture the real resource costs of 
production.  Two indices are used for this purpose.  The first – the Herfindahl index –  is 
widely used (see Earle and Estrin, 1996, for example) and captures the degree of firm market 
power by measuring output shares in respective 2-digit industries.  However, this measure 
does not address an important problem – that is, that similar levels of sectoral concentration 
may be associated with differing levels of competition because defining the relevant 
geographic market can be problematic (for example, a grocery store’s market is much more 
restricted than that of a manufacturing plant).  For this reason, a second measure of 
competition – the overall firm turnover rate – is used.  This measures the fraction of firms 
which exit and enter a certain sector in a given year, and as such proxies the degree to which 
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markups from imperfect competition induce market entry.  Since the Yugoslav economy 
was, by Western standards, characterized by low levels of competition,18 a lack of entry 
indicates high barriers to entry (e.g. high sunk costs or continued government subsidies to 
incumbents).  In the absence of entry, firms can thus be posited to possess market power.  
Moreover, firm exit can also be seen to be strongly tied to competition because a 
competitive environment is more hostile and likely to produce bankrupt firms.  However, 
even with these modifications, the data do not allow us to consider competition from 
imports, which may be an important factor in determining competition given the openness 
of Slovenia’s economy. 
 
3.) Results 
 Tables 3a and 3b presents the results of joint estimations of equations (1) and (6) on 
the entire panel of plant-level data spanning the 1992-2001 period. Due to the way the 
parameters enter the model, the regressions are estimated using nonlinear least squares.  
When examining these results, we should bear in mind that these results describe the average 
wage-productivity profiles over the first 10 years of Slovenia’s transition, a turbulent period 
during which we would expect significant changes in the wage and productivity profiles of 
various demographic groups.  (For this reason, I present estimates of these regressions on 
the annual, cross-sectional data in the next section.) 
 
18 A 1990 OECD economic report on Yugoslavia notes that "the institutional set-up has encouraged vertical 
integration and oligopolistic behaviour in the context of regional autarky" (p. 41). "Barriers to entry applied 
not only to private business but also to socialized companies if this threatened the regional or local 
monopoly of large conglomerates" (p. 42). 
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Table 3a: Joint Estimates of Nonlinear Least Squares Production Function and Wage Equations, 
using complete data from 1992-2001 (table is continued on next page) 
 Log(Value Added) 
(1) 
Log(Wages) 
(2) 
p-value, (1) = (2) 
log(Labor) 1.21 1.10 ... 
(0.010) (0.002)  
Productive inputs 
and competition 
control variables log(Capital) 0.04 … ... 
(0.007)   
(log(Labor))2 0.01 … ... 
(0.002)   
(log(Capital))2 0.02 … ... 
(0.001)   
log(Labor b Capital) -0.05 … ... 
(0.002)   
0.27 -0.08 ... Overall firm 
turnover rate (0.059) (0.055)  
Herfindahl Index -0.11 0.00 ... 
(0.042) (0.039)  
De novo (private) 1.07 0.75 0.00 Firm Characteristics  (0.009) (0.008)  
1.14 0.82 0.00 Formerly state owned (private) (0.009) (0.008)  
Foreign-owned 1.24 1.24 0.99 
(0.009) (0.009) 
1.04 1.04 0.91 Dummy for entry 
within current year (0.029) (0.027)  
Dummy for exit 
after current year 0.52 0.71 
0.00 
(0.019) (0.017)  
Rural firm dummy 0.90 0.96 0.00 
(0.006) (0.005)  
R2 0.8185 0.8625  
Adjusted R2 0.8184 0.8624  
F-statistic 13279.24 20710.42  
N 109,023 109,023  
Notes:  Standard errors of the estimates are reported in parentheses. The third column presents p-values for 
the Wald test for the equality of the corresponding coefficients in that row. Estimates of the intercept are not 
reported. The excluded age category comprises of workers less than 30 years old, the excluded education 
category comprises of workers with unfinished elementary education, and the excluded firm type are 
cooperatives and firms with mixed or state ownership.  Other control variables included in both equations are 
industry and year dummies. 
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Table 3b: Joint Estimates of Nonlinear Least Squares Production Function and Wage Equations, 
using complete data from 1992-2001 (cont.) 
Log(Value Added) 
(1) 
Log(Wages) 
(2) 
p-value, (1) = (2) 
Women 0.93 1.01 0.00 Demographic 
characteristics  (0.007) (0.005)  
30-39 years old 1.00 1.06 0.00 
(0.010) (0.007)  
40-49 years old 0.99 1.14 0.00 
(0.010) (0.008)  
50+ 1.01 1.29 0.00 
(0.015) (0.013)  
2-5 years tenure 0.97 1.04 0.00 
(0.007) (0.006)  
5+ years tenure 0.87 1.00 0.00 
(0.013) (0.010)  
Completed 
elementary school 1.14 1.08 0.27 
(0.042) (0.027)  
Vocational school 1.27 1.24 0.49 
(0.045) (0.029)  
High school 1.79 1.44 0.00 
(0.062) (0.033)  
2-year college 2.11 1.63 0.00 
(0.075) (0.039)  
4-year college 2.39 1.79 0.00 
(0.084) (0.042)  
R2 0.8185 0.8625  
Adjusted R2 0.8184 0.8624  
F-statistic 13279.24 20710.42  
N 109,023 109,023  
Notes: See notes on previous page. 
 
The regressions yield several interesting results.  Most noticeable is the stark 
discrepancy in the wage and productivity differentials in both privatized and newly created 
firms.  While newly created (private) firms are 7 percent more productive than their state-
owned counterparts (with S = 1.07 in the left column), their wages are 25 percent lower 
(T=0.75 in the right column); similarly, formerly state-owned firms are 14 percent more 
productive yet pay 18 percent lower wages.  The results thus appear to be in line with Ward’s 
(1958) theoretical model on firm behavior under workers self-management, which predicts 
that workers in self-managed firms will appropriate some of the firm’s profits and thus earn 
more than their MPL would warrant.  However, this finding is complicated by the 
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productivity and wage differentials in foreign-owned firms which – assuming foreign owned 
firms exhibit behavior consistent with profit-maximization – appear to indicate that the 
wage/productivity differentials in state-owned firms are justified: foreign owned firms are 24 
percent more productive than state-owned ones, and their productivity differentials are also 
not statistically significantly different from this 24 percent. 
 The coefficients for the demographic characteristics are also interesting.  Contrary to 
previous empirical findings, neither of the coefficients for women deviate considerably from 
1 – although the estimates of SF = 0.93 and TF = 1.01 are both statistically distinguishable 
from 1, this difference is not practically meaningful.  These plant level results conflict with 
individual-level wage regressions (reported in Appendix 2) on the same data, which indicate 
a statistically significant wage gap of 13 percent.  How can we reconcile these findings? It 
appears that while women’s wages do reflect their marginal productivities – and thus, little 
evidence of plant-level gender discrimination exists – women tend to be segregated in firms 
and industries with lower wages in general. Narrowing the gender wage gap would thus 
require women to enter occupations (and firms) that pay higher wages. 
 I next turn to the estimates of age-productivity and age-wage differentials.  The 
results indicate that older workers are neither more nor less productive than the base group, 
individuals under 30 years of age – the estimates for S are not statistically distinguishable 
from 1.19 These age-productivity profiles appear to differ from empirical findings from 
other studies, which find evidence of concave profiles in which worker productivity peaks at 
around 40 years of age (Ilmakunnas et al, 2002; Hellerstein et al, 1999). Their relative wages, 
by contrast, yield a starkly different conclusion – older workers earn a wage premium that 
 
19 These results are particularly striking in light of Slovenia’s early retirement schemes, which we would 
expect to have decreased the number of the relatively lower paid – and, presumably, less productive –  
older workers in the workforce (see preceding discussion). 
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ranges from 6 percent for those between 30 and 39 years old to 29 percent for those older 
than 50.  The wage determination process appears to be most strongly influenced by the 
collective bargaining agreements, which mandate minimum wage levels for older workers. 
 Examining the wage and productivity differentials regarding job tenure yields 
similarly puzzling findings as those regarding age.  The estimates imply that productivity 
tends to decrease with tenure, averaging 3 percent less after 2-5 years at a firm and 13 
percent thereafter. These results are in stark contrast with theoretical predictions, which 
predict that productivity should, at the very least, increase with tenure as workers acquire 
firm-specific knowledge and skills.  The wage profiles indicate a weakly concave profile in 
which individuals with 2-5 years of tenure earn a 4 percent wage premium that disappears 
for those with longer tenure. 
 The wage and productivity differentials for various educational groups are largely in 
accord with our theoretical predictions and previous empirical evidence. Examining the 
productivity profiles shows a steep increase in productivity with increased education, 
indicating that those with completed elementary education are 14 percent more productive 
than those with uncompleted elementary education, while those with at least four year 
college degrees are 139 percent more productive.  Comparing these figures with the wage 
differentials shows continuing evidence of wage compression, as individuals are consistently 
paid about a third less than their MPL would warrant in every educational group with the 
exception of those who completed vocational school. 
 The other coefficients are also of some interest. Most of the second order 
coefficients of the translog production function are significant, providing evidence against a 
Cobb-Douglas specification of the model. It thus appears that the marginal rate of 
substitution between capital and labor is not constant, and underscoring the complexity of 
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the production processes.  Rural firms appear less productive than firms in urban locales; 
similarly, they pay slightly lower wages than urban firms.  Both coefficients appear to reflect 
the fact that urban firms operate in environments with more developed factor and product 
markets, while rural firms operate in environments where the prices that should serve as 
signaling devices for gauging opportunity costs are distorted by informational asymmetry in 
the market. 
 It is also interesting to note that the standard errors of the coefficient estimates are 
consistently higher in the production function estimates.  This indicates a higher degree of 
heterogeneity amongst firms in their productivity than in their wage policies, and is possibly 
indicative of the rigidities that collective bargaining agreements continue to impose on a 
firm’s wage policy. Alternatively, it could indicate that a functional labor market exists, as 
firms have to match the market wage irrespective of their productivity. 
 Finally, it is instructive to examine the bias that would have arisen had we failed to 
account for differences in labor quality in the plant level production functions.20 To this 
end, the joint estimation of two such equations is presented in Appendix 3. Interestingly 
enough, the bias that arises in the production function generally appears statistically 
insignificant.  The sole exception is the coefficient for foreign-owned firms, where the 
difference is statistically significant according to the Wald test.  In this case, the simple 
production function predicts a 6 percentage point higher marginal productivity than the 
labor-quality augmented one. This upward bias in the simple production function is 
consistent with what we would expect given that foreign owned firms tend to employ 
relatively more skilled workers than other firms – the failure to account for the superior 
 
20 The magnitude of this bias is particularly informative given that, to the author’s knowledge, no empirical 
studies on productivity in transition economies have estimated labor-quality augmented production 
functions. 
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workforce means that the simple production function overestimates the productivity of 
foreign owned firms. The fact that the other coefficients are similar for both production 
functions possibly reflects a much more similar demographic labor force composition 
between privatized, de novo and state owned firms. If the workforces are similarly 
homogeneous across firms of differing ownership types in other countries as well, we can 
cautiously conclude that the majority of existing studies on firm productivity in transition 
economies have not been severely biased by the omission of labor quality controls in their 
empirical models. 
 
Since the data allow us to track the evolution of wage and productivity differentials 
from 1992 to 2001, I now present results from cross-sectional regressions identical to the 
ones presented in Table 2 that have been estimated for each individual year. Due to the large 
number of coefficients estimated, the results are presented in the figures below. 
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Figure 2: Estimates of productivity and wage differentials by firm ownership type, 
1992 - 2001 
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Base group: Cooperatives and firms with mixed or state ownership. 
Figure 1 indicates that, apart from a dip in 1994, private and foreign owned firms 
have indeed been more productive than state-owned ones, and that foreign-owned firms 
have exhibited less variable performance than non-foreign owned firms.  The data appear to 
support the hypothesis first postulated by Ward (1958) that workers in a worker-managed 
firm will engage in rent sharing, thus garnering wages that are higher than their marginal 
productivity would warrant.  This can be seen by noting that all types of private firms – de 
novo, privatized, and foreign-owned – are more productive than the omitted group, state-
owned firms, for every year except 1994.  Examining the corresponding wage profiles shows 
that state-owned firms paid a premium wage relative to privatized and de novo firms, and this 
difference posts a sharp decrease as transition progresses.  It is also interesting to note that 
foreign owned firms are both more productive and tend to pay higher wages; thus, 
Slovenian’s traditional mistrust for relinquishing control of their firms to non-Slovenians 
appears completely unwarranted.  
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Figure 3: Estimates of productivity and wage differentials of women relative to men, 
1992 - 2001 
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Base group: Men. 
The wage and productivity profiles of women underscores the fact that the transition period 
had little effect on women – both profiles appear to remain rather constant relative to men. 
Furthermore, although the labor market was highly regulated under socialism, it nevertheless 
appeared to operate efficiently. 
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 Figure 4: Estimates of productivity and wage differentials by age, 1992 - 2001 
Base group: Individuals less than 30 years old. 
Examining the wage and productivity differentials of workers of various ages reveals 
a fascinating dynamic that has evolved during the process of transition: both the relative 
wages and marginal productivities of older workers have been consistently decreasing over 
this ten year period.  Thus, while the oldest group of workers were 37 percent more 
productive than the youngest group at the onset of transition, their marginal productivity 
was 7 percent lower by 2001; for the second oldest group, their marginal productivity fell 
from 19 percent above the youngest group to 10 percent below them by 2001.  The drop in 
relative wages has been even more dramatic: for the oldest workers, relative wages have 
declined from T=1.86 to T=1.13; for the second oldest group, relative wages have fallen from 
T=1.38 to T=1.05.21 This dramatic drop in both productivity and wages may be indicative of 
a larger, more long-term problem facing transition economies. The drop in the productivity 
of older workers may be due to their inability to acquire the knowledge or skills demanded 
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of workers in a market economy – in other words, just as transition economies have suffered 
from obsolete physical capital, they may face the challenge of a workforce whose human 
capital has been rendered useless in a market economy. 
Figure 7: Estimates of productivity and wage differentials by education, 1992 - 2001 
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Base group: Uncompleted elementary school.  
 Examining the effects of education on productivity and relative wages over time 
illustrates a gradual dispersion in the wage and productivity differential distribution.  It also 
indicates that individuals with at least 4-year college degrees have witnessed quite substantial 
gains in both their relative marginal productivities and wage differentials, while other 
educational groups appear to have witnessed a small increase in the dispersion of their wage 
differentials relative to the base group, and little change in their relative productivity 
differentials. Considering the extreme wage compression under the previous regime, 
however, we might have expected a greater increase in wage dispersion (on the other hand, 
however, the compressed wage structure appears to have been warranted by the relatively 
low marginal productivity of well educated groups in 1992). 
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4.) Conclusion 
 Traditional empirical tests of wage determination theories typically fail to include 
direct measures of an individual’s marginal productivity, making it difficult to make robust 
conclusions about the wage determination process.  Similarly, traditional approaches to 
estimating firm productivity across different types of firms typically fail to account for 
differences in the quality of a firm’s labor-force, making it difficult to calculate unbiased 
productivity measures.  The proceeding study overcomes both of these shortcomings by 
using matched employer-employee data to jointly estimate plant level production functions 
and wage equations. This allows us to make a direct comparison of wage and productivity 
differentials across various demographic groups and firm ownership types.  
 In general, the results indicate that wage and productivity differentials have been 
progressively converging over the transition period, indicating that market liberalization is in 
fact becoming a reality in Slovenia. Moreover, the results of this study strongly support the 
theory that worker appropriation of capital rents in state-owned firms was occurring under 
workers’ self-management, and that this phenomenon persisted into the early phase of 
transition, as indicated by the discrepancy between the marginal products and the wage 
differentials of workers in state-owned firms vis-à-vis their counterparts in privately owned 
firms.  Foreign owned firms appear to be highly beneficial for the Slovenian economy, as 
they are not only significantly more productive than the average firm, but they consistently 
pay higher wages as well.  The relative productivity of older workers has witnessed a 
dramatic fall during the first decade of transition, indicating that older workers are 
experiencing difficulty acquiring the skills necessary in a modern capitalist economy. This 
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problem may have significant consequences for unwary governments even several decades 
down the road, and may prove especially difficult for governments who may need to 
increase the retirement age to counter the effects of a generally aging population.  
Furthermore, although the discrepancy in the wage and productivity differentials for older 
workers has decreased considerably over the first decade of transition, the persisting wage 
premium indicates that overly restrictive labor laws and mandated seniority wages may be 
hindering productivity growth and weakening the employment prospects of older workers 
who are unemployed. In general, however, the regression results indicate that the wage and 
productivity profiles in Slovenia across different types of workers and firms are increasingly 
approaching a competitive market structure, a development that is especially interesting in 
light of Slovenia’s relatively slow pace of structural reform. 
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Appendix 1: Comparison of sample employment with actual employment
Year
Number of firms in
initial firm sample
Number of firms in
matched employer
employee data
Total employment in
initial firm sample
Total employment in
matched employer-
employee data
Official employment
in formal sector
Percentage of official
employment in
matched employer-
employee data
1992 21046 5973 525600 468717 658922 71.1%
1993 28,975 8,565 484,350 440,983 629,016 70.1%
1994 32,723 10,411 475,880 431,446 605,496 71.3%
1995 34,997 12,742 485,841 431,407 594,394 72.6%
1996 36,939 13,867 467,851 428,611 581,106 73.8%
1997 37,800 14,956 457,919 423,233 593,086 71.4%
1998 38,454 15,464 455,278 411,712 591,653 69.6%
1999 38,427 15,819 455,594 405,237 606,982 66.8%
2000 38,056 13,850 454,897 365,424 615,493 59.4%
2001 37,210 10,032 457,455 334,928 626,444 53.5%
Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Slovenia, various years; own tabulations.
Appendix 2: Results from standard log-linear wage regression on individual-level 
data 
 Dependent variable: Log(wages) 
Women -0.13 
(0.01) 
Completed Elementary School 0.10 
(0.002) 
Vocational school 0.25 
(0.002) 
High School 0.54 
(0.002) 
2-year college 0.89 
(0.003) 
4-year college 1.22 
(0.003) 
30-39 0.27 
(0.059) 
40-49 -0.11 
(0.042) 
50+ 1.07 
(0.009) 
2-5 years tenure 1.14 
(0.009) 
5+ years tenure 1.24 
(0.009) 
Constant 1.04 
(0.029) 
F-stat 30,621.92 
R^2 0.3634 
N 1,019,759 
Notes: White-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. All the coefficients are significant at the 5 percent 
level. Variables included in the regression but excluded from the table include year dummies, industry 
dummies, and ownership type dummies. 
 
Matija Vodopivec Wage and Productivity Differentials in Slovenia 
 
59
Appendix 3: Joint Estimates of Nonlinear Least Squares Production Function and 
Wage Equations, using complete data from 1992-2001 and omitting labor quality 
terms 
 Log(Value Added) 
(1) 
Log(Wages) 
(2) 
p-value, (1) = (2) 
log(Labor) 1.15 1.08 ... 
(0.010) (0.002)  
Productive inputs 
and competition 
control variables log(Capital) 0.01 ... ... 
(0.008)   
(log(Labor))2 0.00 ... ... 
(0.002)   
(log(Capital))2 0.02 ... ... 
(0.001)   
log(Labor b Capital) -0.04 ... ... 
(0.002)   
0.37 -0.07 ... Overall firm 
turnover rate (0.060) (0.057)  
Herfindahl Index -0.20 -0.03 ... 
0.04 (0.039)  
De novo (private) 1.05 0.66 0.00 Firm Characteristics  (0.009) (0.008)  
1.13 0.77 0.00 Formerly state 
owned (private) (0.009) (0.008)  
Foreign-owned 1.30 1.30 0.88 
(0.009) (0.009) 
1.05 1.02 0.43 Dummy for entry 
within current year (0.030) (0.027)  
Dummy for exit 
after current year 0.50 0.67 
0.00 
(0.019) (0.017)  
Rural firm dummy 0.87 0.93 0.00 
(0.006) (0.006)  
R2 0.8107 0.8391  
Adjusted R2 0.8106 0.8391  
F-statistic 17,949 27,465  
N 109,023 109,023  
Notes:  Standard errors of the estimates are reported in parentheses. The third column presents p-values for 
the Wald test for the equality of the corresponding coefficients in that row. Estimates of the intercept are not 
reported. The excluded firm type comprises of are cooperatives and firms with mixed or state ownership.  
Control variables included in both equations are industry and year dummies. 
 
